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THE UNIT OF ANALYSIS IN ENTREPRENEURSHIP RESEARCH:  
OPPORTUNITIES OR INVESTMENTS? 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
The entrepeneurship literature in management focuses increasingly on opportunities — their 
creation or discovery, evaluation, and exploitation — as the unit of analysis. We argue first, 
that the opportunity perspective emerged from the “functional” literature in the economics of 
entrepreneurship (mainly the works of Israel Kirzner), a literature that emphasizes not the in-
dividual entrepreneur per se, but the functions (e.g., market clearing) that entrepreneurs under-
take in a market economy; second, that most notions of entrepreneurship in economics and 
management are not easily integrated into the theory of the firm; third, that the popular em-
phasis on opportunity discovery tends to direct attention from opportunity exploitation; and 
fourth, that the Cantillon-Mises-Knight view of entrepreneurship as judgment links more na-
turally with the economic theory of the firm. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Scientific fields and disciplines are usually defined by the key questions they ask and the an-
swers they provide.  But clarity on these questions and answers may arrive late (Leijonhufvud, 
1976).  New fields may emerge and even flourish despite ambiguity about units of analysis, accept-
able methods and techniques, phenomena to be explained, and how problems should be dimensio-
nalized. The strategic management field, for example, continues to thrive without agreeing on the 
unit of analysis (resources, capabilities, competences, configurations, value chains, rents, or some-
thing else?). By contrast, the field of transaction cost economics seems to have progressed as the 
unit of analysis was defined (as the transaction) and this unit was appropriately dimensionalized 
(Williamson, 1999).  
Historically, the entrepreneurship field has been like the strategic management field in that it 
lacks consensus on key issues such as the unit of analysis. Recently, however, the field has made an 
attempt to become more like transaction cost economics. Specifically, many contributors have ar-
gued that entrepreneurship studies should embrace the opportunity as the main phenomenon of in-
terest, defining the field in terms of the emergence, discovery, and development of opportunities 
(Shane, 2000; Shane and Venkatamaran, 2000; McMullen and Shepherd, 2006; McMullen, Plum-
mer and Acs, 2007). Shane (2003: 4–5) provides a clear statement of this approach:  
Entrepreneurship is an activity that involves the discovery, evaluation, and exploita-
tion of opportunities to introduce new goods and services, ways of organizing, mar-
kets, process, and raw materials through organizing efforts that previously had not 
existed (Venkataraman, 1997; Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). Given this defini-
tion, the academic field of entrepreneurship incorporates, in its domain, explanations 
for why, when and how entrepreneurial opportunities exist; the sources of those op-
portunities and the forms that they take; the processes of opportunity discovery and 
evaluation; the acquisition of resources for the exploitation of these opportunities; 
the act of opportunity exploitation; why, when, and how some individuals and not 
others discover, evaluate, gather resources for and exploit opportunities; the strate-
gies used to pursue opportunities; and the organizing efforts to exploit them (Shane 
and Venkataraman, 2000). 
The large body of research embracing this perspective suggests an emerging consensus on the 
view that opportunities and their discovery, evaluation, and exploitation should be the main focus of 
entrepreneurship studies. This possible “hardening of the core” (Leijonhufvud, 1976) comes at a 
time when entrepreneurship is becoming one of the fastest-growing subfields in management re-
search. Entrepreneurship became a Division (specialized interest group) within the Academy of 
Management in 1987, is becoming one of the most popular subjects at U.S. colleges and universi-
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ties (Gartner and Vesper, 2001; Solomon, Duffy, and Tarabishy, 2002). While the field remains a 
minority specialization among business school faculty (Katz, 2003), during the 1990s the number of 
entrepreneurship positions increased by over 250% and the number of candidates nearly doubled 
(Finkle and Deeds, 2001).  
This growing importance of entrepreneurship as a field makes the selection of a unit of analysis 
even more important. Here we review and critique the opportunity-discovery approach, suggesting 
that the focus on opportunities has limitations that have not been adequately addressed in the entre-
preneurship literature. We argue that the management literature emphasizing opportunity discovery 
tends to misunderstand Kirzner’s (1973, 1979, 1985, 1992) model of the entrepreneurial market 
process, the main source for the opportunity-discovery approach. Moreover, and more important, 
the opportunity-discovery emphasis has made it difficult to link the entrepreneur to the firm, the 
locus of most entrepreneurial activity (Foss and Klein, 2005).   
We agree with the opportunity-discovery literature that Austrian economics provides a natural 
foundation for entrepreneurship research (e.g., Shane, 2000; MacMullen, Plummer and Acs, 2007). 
However, we do not stress the well-known Austrian concepts of distributed, tacit knowledge and 
entrepreneurial discovery (Hayek, 1945, 1968; Kirzner, 1973, 1979, 1985, 1992). Rather, we main-
tain that entrepreneurship can be more thoroughly grounded by adopting the Cantillon-Knight-
Mises understanding of entrepreneurship as judgment.  Not only does the Knightian (Knight, 1921) 
notion of judgment go beyond opportunity discovery by also including the evaluation and exploita-
tion of opportunities, it also provides a natural link to the theory of the firm and strategic manage-
ment ⎯ natural allies of entrepreneurship research ⎯ that is not provided by the notion of opportu-
nity discovery.  
Our overall approach below is to ask if, and how, the entrepreneur needs a firm. The answers 
are not obvious. Some approaches to entrepreneurship—Schumpeter’s concept of the entrepreneur 
as innovator, for instance—treat the entrepreneur as an uncaused cause, a pure genius who operates 
outside the usual constraints imposed by resource owners and other market participants and is thus 
unaffected by the firm.1 Others, with whom we side, see the firm as the locus of entrepreneurship 
and indeed argue that the firm and entrepreneurship cannot be separated. We state and update this 
view, and show how it leads to an alternative approach in which investment is the unit of analysis.  
                                                 
1 On the history of the entrepreneurship concept in economic theory, see Elkjaer (1991) and Ibrahim and Vyakarnam 
(2003). 
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We begin by critically surveying various notions of entrepreneurship and the firm in economics 
and various management fields. We argue first, that the opportunity perspective emerged from the 
“functional” literature in the economics of entrepreneurship (mainly Kirzner), a literature that em-
phasizes not the individual entrepreneur per se, but the functions (e.g., market clearing) that entre-
preneurs undertake in a market economy; second, that most notions of entrepreneurship in econom-
ics and management are not easily integrated into the theory of the firm; third, that the popular em-
phasis on opportunity discovery tends to direct attention from opportunity exploitation; and fourth, 
that the Cantillon-Mises-Knight view of entrepreneurship as judgment links more naturally with the 
economic theory of the firm. We thus review the economics and management literatures on entre-
preneurship, critique the dominant opportunity-discovery approach, and outline a new synthesis of 
entrepreneurship and theory of the firm, one that highlights the entrepreneur’s investment behavior 
as the key unit of analysis. 
CONCEPTS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
Entrepreneurship: Occupational, Structural, and Functional perspectives 
We begin by organizing the various strands of entrepreneurship literature, distinguishing among 
occupational, structural, and functional perspectives (for a more extensive treatment, see Klein, 
2008).  Note that these are concepts that are designed to capture the main characteristics of a given 
theory of entrepreneurship, and that theories may contain elements of more than one perspective. 
For example, a theory that stresses the peculiar personality characteristics that may characterize 
entrepreneurs, pointing out that entrepreneurs may not thrive within corporate hierarchies, contain 
elements of what we call “occupational” as well as “structural” theories of entrepreneurship.  
Occupational theories define entrepreneurship as self-employment and treat the individual as 
the unit of analysis, describing the characteristics of individuals who start their own businesses and 
explaining the choice between employment and self-employment (Kihlstrom and Laffont, 1979; 
Shaver and Scott, 1991; Parker, 2004). The labor economics literature on occupational choice (sur-
veyed in Parker, 2004), along with the psychology-based literature on the personal characteristics of 
self-employed individuals, fits in this category. For example, McGrath and MacMillan (2000) argue 
that particular individuals have an “entrepreneurial mindset” that enables and encourages them to 
find opportunities overlooked or ignored by others (and that this mindset is developed through ex-
perience, rather than formal instruction).  
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What are here called structural approaches focus on various structures that influence (e.g., faci-
litate) entrepreneurship, such as the firm or the industry. Indeed, the idea that one firm, industry, or 
economy can be more “entrepreneurial” than another suggests that entrepreneurship is associated 
with a particular structure (e.g., lots of small or young firms). The unit of analysis in such work is 
often the structure — rather than the entrepreneur or the opportunity —, and the “entrepreneurial 
firm” is usually seen as a new or small firm. The literatures on industry dynamics, firm growth, 
clusters, and networks have in mind a structural concept of entrepreneurship (Aldrich, 1990; Acs 
and Audretsch, 1990; Audretsch, Keilbach, and Lehmann, 2005). A particular instance of the struc-
tural approach is the recent literature of spawning (e.g., Gompers, Lerner, and Scharfstein, 2005). 
An even more particular instance is a recent paper by Benz and Frey (2008) which argues that the 
reason is that hierarchies may negatively influence entrepreneurship is because they impact “proce-
dural utility”: Employees who value independence per se has a strong incentive to become self-
employed.  Our argument, which we describe later in this paper, that entrepreneurship should be 
conceptualized as inseparable from firms has elements of the structural view. 
By contrast, the classic contributions to the economic theory of entrepreneurship from Schum-
peter, Knight, Mises, Kirzner, and others model entrepreneurship as a function, activity, or process, 
not an employment category or structure. The entrepreneurial function has been characterized in 
various ways: judgment (Cantillon, 1755; Knight, 1921; Casson, 1982; Langlois and Cosgel, 1993; 
Foss and Klein, 2005), innovation (Schumpeter, 1911), adaptation (Schultz, 1975, 1982), or alert-
ness (Kirzner, 1973, 1979, 1992). In each case, these functional concepts of entrepreneurship are 
largely independent of occupational and structural concepts (the Cantillon-Knight-Mises judgment 
view of entrepreneurship, however, insists on linking entrepreneurship to the firm). The entrepre-
neurial function can be manifested in large and small firms, in old and new firms, by individuals or 
teams, across a variety of occupational categories, it can be very mundane or it can have the heroic 
quality highlighted by Schumpeter; and so on. In fact, many of those who adopt a functionalist ap-
proach to entrepreneurship tend to see entrepreneurship as almost ubiquitous (the exception is ob-
viously Schumpeter). Thus, to Mises entrepreneurship is simply human action under uncertainty 
(Mises, 1949). To Kirzner any human being is capable of exercising “alertness” (Kirzner, 1973). 
These views emerge from the highly functionalist view of these writers: the aim is not to character-
ize specific entrepreneurs, or the psychological make-up that characterize entrepreneurs, but to ex-
plain the function that entrepreneurship partakes of in a market economy; in the case of Mises and 
Kirzner, that of equilibrating markets.   
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A possible import of these broad functionalist views is that, by focusing too narrowly on self-
employment and start-up companies, the contemporary entrepreneurship literature (e.g., Baumol, 
1993; Shane, 2003) may be understating the role of entrepreneurship in the economy and in busi-
ness organization. What, then, are the entrepreneurial functions? Consider these possibilities: man-
agement, imagination or creativity, innovation, alertness, the ability to adjust, charismatic leader-
ship, and judgment, all functions highlighted in key contributions to the entrepreneurship literature.  
The Functions of Entrepreneurs 
Managing a small firm. In the entrepreneurship curriculum of many business schools, the phe-
nomenon under investigation has often been “small-business management.” Entrepreneurs are pic-
tured as the managers of small, family-owned businesses or start-up companies. Entrepreneurship 
consists of routine management tasks, relationships with venture capitalists and other sources of 
external finance, product development, marketing, and so on. The theory of entrepreneurship in this 
approach is the theory of how small business owners organize and manage their assets. Unfortu-
nately, this notion of entrepreneurship is sufficiently elastic to be practically meaningless. It appears 
to include virtually all aspects of small or new business management, while excluding the identical 
tasks when performed within a large or established business. Put differently, if entrepreneurship is 
simply a set of management activities, or any management activity that takes place within a particu-
lar type of firm, then it is unclear why we should bother to add this label to those activities.  
Exercising imagination or creativity. It is common, particularly within the management litera-
ture, to associate entrepreneurship with boldness, daring, imagination, or creativity (Begley and 
Boyd, 1987; Chandler and Jansen, 1992; Aldrich and Wiedenmayer, 1993; Hood and Young, 1993; 
Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). These accounts emphasize the personal, psychological characteristics of 
the entrepreneur. Entrepreneurship, in this conception, is not a necessary component of all human 
decision-making, but a specialized activity that some individuals are particularly well equipped to 
perform.2 Note that such personal characteristics can presumably be acquired by contract on the 
market by purchasing consulting services, project management, and the like. A “non-
entrepreneurial” owner or manager, in other words, can manage the day-to-day operations of the 
                                                 
2 As Gartner (1988: 21) argues, however, this literature employs a host of different (and frequently) contradictory no-
tions of entrepreneurship. A “startling number of traits and characteristics have been attributed to the entrepreneur, and 
a ‘psychological profile’ of the entrepreneur assembled from these studies would portray someone larger than life, full 
of contradictions, and, conversely, someone so full of traits that (s)he would have to be a sort of generic ‘Everyman.’” 
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firm, purchasing “entrepreneurship” on the market as needed. Moreover, the literature does not ex-
plain clearly whether imagination and creativity are necessary, sufficient, or incidental conditions 
for entrepreneurship. Clearly the founders of many firms are imaginative and creative. If not, are 
they not entrepreneurs? 
Innovating. The arguably most influential concept of entrepreneurship in economics is Joseph 
Schumpeter’s idea of the entrepreneur as innovator. Schumpeter’s entrepreneur introduces “new 
combinations”—new products, production methods, markets, sources of supply, or industrial com-
binations—shaking the economy out of its previous equilibrium through a process Schumpeter 
termed “creative destruction” (Schumpeter, 1911, 1939). His emphasis on the entrepreneur grows 
out of his simultaneous admiration for the the general equilibrium system of Walras and his desire 
to explain economic change; in Schumpeter’s theory the entrepreneur is the agent of economic 
change:3  
[I]n capitalist reality as distinguished from its textbook picture, it is not [price] com-
petition which counts but the competition from the new commodity, the new tech-
nology, the new source of supply, the new type of organization . . . competition 
which commands a decisive cost or quality advantage and which strikes not at the 
margins of profits and the outputs of existing firms but at their foundations and their 
very lives (Schumpeter, 1942: 84). 
Schumpeter carefully distinguished the entrepreneur from the capitalist (and strongly criticized 
the neoclassical economists for confusing the two). His entrepreneur need not own capital, or even 
work within the confines of a business firm at all. While the entrepreneur could be a manager or 
owner of a firm, he is more likely to be an independent contractor or craftsman. In Schumpeter’s 
conception, “… people act as entrepreneurs only when they actually carry out new combinations, 
and lose the character of entrepreneurs as soon as they have built up their business, after which they 
settle down to running it as other people run their businesses” (Ekelund and Hébert, 1990: 569).  
This suggests a rather tenuous relationship between the entrepreneur and the firm he owns, 
works for, or contracts with. Entrepreneurship is exercised within the firm when it introduces new 
products, processes, or strategies, but not otherwise. The day-to-day operations of the firm need not 
involve entrepreneurship at all. Moreover, because Schumpeterian entrepreneurship is largely inde-
pendent of its environment, the nature and structure of the firm does not affect the level of entrepre-
neurship. Corporate R&D budgets, along with organizational structures that encourage managerial 
                                                 
3 This could include, but is not limited to, the formation of new business ventures.  
 8
commitment to innovation (Hoskisson and Hitt, 1994), have little to do with Schumpeterian entre-
preneurship per se. 4  
Being alert to profit opportunities.  Another highly influential understanding of entrepreneur-
ship is that it consists of being “alert” to hitherto undiscovered profit opportunities. While present in 
Cantillon’s and J. B. Clark’s notions of entrepreneurship, this concept has been elaborated most 
fully by Israel Kirzner (1973, 1979, 1992), a student of Ludwig von Mises.  Kirzner’s formulation 
emphasizes the nature of competition as a discovery process (Hayek, 1968): the source of entrepre-
neurial profit is superior insight — the discovery of something (new products, cost-saving technol-
ogy) unknown to other market participants. The simplest case is that of the arbitrageur, who discov-
ers a discrepancy in present prices that can be exploited for financial gain. In a more typical case, 
the entrepreneur is alert to a new product or a superior production process and steps in to fill this 
market gap before others. Success, in this view, comes not from following a well-specified maximi-
zation problem, but from having some knowledge or insight that no one else has—that is, from 
something beyond the given means-end framework.5 
Kirzner’s entrepreneurs do not own capital; they need only be alert to profit opportunities. Be-
cause they own no assets, they bear no uncertainty. Critics have seized on this point as a defect in 
Kirzner’s conception. According to this criticism, mere alertness to a profit opportunity is not suffi-
cient for earning profits. To reap financial gain, the entrepreneur must invest resources to realize the 
                                                 
4 Other writers influenced by Schumpeter, however, such as Baumol (1993a), do view public and private R&D, the 
scale and scope of patent protection, and basic science education as important determinants of the level of entrepre-
neurial activity.  Moreover, it has often been argued that Schumpeter strongly revised his views on entrepreneurship 
from the 1911 book to the 1942 book, in which, allegedly, he argued that the emergence of the large modern corpora-
tion with its routinized innovation machine in the form of R&D labs had spelled the obsolescence of the entrepreneur.  
For a critical reading of this view, see Langlois (2002). See also Knudsen and Becker (2003) for the case that Schumpe-
ter's functional concept of the innovator-entrepreneur is largely absent from the 1911 book, which emphasizes leader-
ship, emerging only later in a 1928 essay. 
 
5 It is important to distinguish Kirzner’s view of superior foresight from Stigler’s search model in which the value of 
new knowledge is known in advance, available to anyone willing to pay the relevant search costs. “Stigler's searcher 
decides how much time it is worth spending rummaging through dusty attics and untidy drawers looking for a sketch 
which (the family recalls) Aunt Enid thought might be by Lautrec.  Kirzner’s entrepreneur enters a house and glances 
lazily at the pictures which have been hanging in the same place for years. ‘Isn't that a Lautrec on the wall?’” (Ricketts, 
1987: 58). 
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discovered profit opportunity. “Entrepreneurial ideas without money are mere parlor games until 
the money is obtained and committed to the projects” (Rothbard, 1985: 283). Moreover, excepting 
the few cases where buying low and selling high are nearly instantaneous (say, electronic trading of 
currencies or commodity futures), even arbitrage transactions require some time to complete. The 
selling price may fall before the arbitrageur has made his sale, and thus even the pure arbitrageur 
faces some probability of loss. In Kirzner’s formulation, the worst that can happen to an entrepre-
neur is the failure to discover an existing profit opportunity. Entrepreneurs either earn profits or 
break even, but it is unclear how they suffer losses. 
For these reasons, the connection between Kirznerian entrepreneurship and the theory of the 
firm is uncertain. Owners, managers, employees, and independent contractors can all be alert to new 
profit opportunities. Kirzner’s entrepreneur does not need a firm to exercise his function in the 
economy. For these reasons, the link between Kirznerian entrepreneurship and other branches of 
economic analysis, such as industrial organization, innovation, and the theory of the firm, is weak. 
Hence Kirzner’s concept has not generated a large body of applications in economics,6 although it 
has been foundational to the recent opportunity-discovery literature in management.  
Adjusting to the environment. Schultz (1975, 1979, 1982), like Schumpeter, works in the Wa-
lrasian tradition. However, unlike Walras and Schumpeter, Schultz recognizes that markets do not 
automatically and instantaneously regain equilibrium following an exogenous shock. “[R]egaining 
equilibrium takes time, and how people proceed over time depends on their efficiency in responding 
to any given disequilibrium and on the costs and returns of the sequence of adjustments available to 
them” (Schultz 1975: 829). Surprisingly, economists have devoted little attention to this problem. 
Even Schumpeter, who saw economic progress as the result of disruptions to existing equilibrium 
states, assumed that equilibrium is quickly regained following such a disruption. Schultz, by con-
trast, took innovation as given, and focused how economic agents adjust to exogenous shocks.7  
                                                 
6 Exceptions include Ekelund and Saurman (1988), Holcombe (1992), Harper (1995), and Sautet (2001). 
7 An example is farmers in a developing economy. Such people must “deal with a sequence of changes in economic 
conditions, which are in general not of their own making because they originate mainly out of the activities of people 
other than farm people. For this reason Schumpeter’s theory of economic development is far from sufficient to explain 
most of these changes” (Schultz 1975:  832). Moreover, the atomistic nature of agriculture and the unique aspects of 
farm production generate problems of collective action and by–product behavior (Olson, 1965), making such adjust-
ments lengthier. 
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In Schultz’s formulation, entrepreneurship is the ability to adjust, or reallocate one’s resources, 
in response to changing circumstances. As such, entrepreneurship is an aspect of all human beha-
vior, not a unique function performed by a class of specialists. “No matter what part of the economy 
is being investigated, we observe that people are consciously reallocating their resources in re-
sponse to changes in economic conditions” (Schultz 1979:2). Businessmen, farmers, housewives, 
students, and even university presidents, deans, and research directors make Schultz’s (1979) list of 
entrepreneurs.  
Somewhat paradoxically, the degree to which entrepreneurship is manifested in a society is it-
self determined by supply and demand. The demand for entrepreneurial services is given by the 
expected gains from adjusting one’s resources in the face of the disequilibrium, itself a function of 
some characteristics of that disequilibrium. The supply of entrepreneurial capacities is given by 
agents’ abilities to perceive and exploit opportunities. Like any economic good, entrepreneurship is 
valuable and scarce (Schultz 1979, p. 6). Knight and Kirzner treat entrepreneurship as “extra–
economic,” meaning that it is the driving force behind the pricing process, but is not itself traded 
and priced on the market. Schultz (1979) insists that entrepreneurial ability, like other services 
available for hire, is a resource with a market price and quantity, though he did not develop this 
insight into a fully specified theory of the supply of and demand for entrepreneurship. 
Schultz conceives entrepreneurial ability as a form of human capital. Like other forms of human 
capital, this ability can be increased through education, training, experience, health care, and so on. 
While education and other human–capital investments also lead to improvements in technical and 
allocative efficiency, Schultz argues that efficiency improvements cannot account for all of the ef-
fects of education on economic performance, particularly in agricultural communities during pe-
riods of modernization. At least part of the returns to education are the returns to improved abilities 
to adjust to change, for instance by adopting new technology and organizational practices. Moreo-
ver, an economy’s aggregate stock of entrepreneurial ability can also be increased by the immigra-
tion of people with particular entrepreneurial experiences and skills (presumably in response to in-
creased opportunities for entrepreneurial gain). 
Being a charismatic leader. In the view of entrepreneurs as charismatic leaders, entrepreneurs 
specialize in communication — the ability to articulate a plan, a set of rules, or a broader vision, 
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and impose it on others (e.g., Casson, 2000). The successful entrepreneur excels at communicating 
these models to others, who come to share the entrepreneur’s vision (and become his followers). 
Such entrepreneurs are also typically optimistic, self-confident, and enthusiastic (though it is not 
clear whether these are necessary conditions). Witt (1998a, 1998b) describes entrepreneurship simi-
larly as “cognitive leadership.” He outlines an entrepreneurial theory of the firm that combines re-
cent literature on cognitive psychology with Kirzner’s concept of alertness. Entrepreneurs require 
complementary factors of production, he argues, which are coordinated within the firm. For the firm 
to be successful, the entrepreneur must establish a tacit, shared framework of goals, which governs 
the relationships among members of the entrepreneur’s team. As Langlois (1998) points out, it is 
often easier (less costly) for individuals to commit to a specific individual, the leader, rather than an 
abstract set of complex rules governing the firm’s operations. The appropriate exercise of charis-
matic authority, then, reduces coordination costs within organizations. 
While formulating a business plan, communicating a “corporate culture,” and the like are clear-
ly important dimensions of business leadership, are they attributes of the successful manager or the 
successful entrepreneur? Even if top-level managerial skill were the same as entrepreneurship, it is 
unclear why charismatic leadership should be regarded as more “entrepreneurial” than other, com-
paratively mundane managerial tasks such as structuring incentives, limiting opportunism, adminis-
tering rewards, and so on. 
Exercising judgment. An alternative to the foregoing accounts is that entrepreneurship consists 
of judgmental decision-making under conditions of uncertainty. Judgment refers primarily to busi-
ness decision-making when the range of possible future outcomes, let alone the likelihood of individual 
outcomes, is generally unknown (what Knight [1921] terms uncertainty, rather than mere probabilistic 
risk). This view finds expression in the earliest known discussion of entrepreneurship, namely Can-
tillon (1755). Cantillon argues that all market participants, with the exception of landowners and the 
nobility, can be classified as either entrepreneurs or wage earners:  
Entrepreneurs work for uncertain wages, so to speak, and all others for certain wages 
until they have them, although their functions and their rank are very disproportio-
nate. The General who has a salary, the Courtier who has a pension, and the Domes-
tic who has wages, are in the latter class. All the others are Entrepreneurs, whether 
they establish themselves with a capital to carry on their enterprise, or are Entrepre-
neurs of their own work without any capital, and they may be considered as living 
subject to uncertainty; even Beggars and Robbers are Entrepreneurs of this class 
(Cantillon, 1755: 54). 
 12
In other words, bearing risk — that is, making decisions under conditions of uncertainty and 
bearing the consequences of those decisions oneself — is the entrepreneur’s raison d’être. 
Judgment is distinct from boldness, innovation, alertness, and leadership. Judgment must be ex-
ercised in mundane circumstances, for ongoing operations as well as new ventures. While alertness 
tends to be passive (perhaps even hard to distinguish from luck, Demsetz 1983), judgment is active. 
Alertness is the ability to react to existing opportunities while judgment refers to the creation of new 
opportunities.8 Entrepreneurs “… are those who seek to profit by actively promoting adjustment to 
change. They are not content to passively adjust their . . . activities to readily foreseeable changes or 
changes that have already occurred in their circumstances; rather, they regard change itself as an 
opportunity to meliorate their own conditions and aggressively attempt to anticipate and exploit it” 
(Salerno, 1993: 123). Those who specialize in judgmental decision-making may be dynamic, cha-
rismatic leaders, but they need not possess these traits. Decision making under uncertainty is entre-
preneurial, whether it involves imagination, creativity, leadership, and related factors or not. 
Knight introduces judgment to link profit, primarily, and the existence of the firm, secondarily, 
to uncertainty. Entrepreneurship represents judgment that cannot be assessed in terms of its margin-
al product and which cannot, accordingly, be paid a wage (Knight, 1921: 311). In other words, there 
is no market for the judgment that entrepreneurs rely on, and therefore exercising judgment requires 
the person with judgment to start a firm. Judgment thus implies asset ownership, for judgmental 
decision making is ultimately decision making about the employment of resources. An entrepreneur 
without capital goods is, in Knight’s sense, no entrepreneur (Foss and Klein, 2005). 
Entrepreneurship as uncertainty bearing is also important for Mises’s theory of profit and loss, a 
cornerstone of his well–known critique of economic planning under socialism. Mises begins with 
the marginal productivity theory of distribution developed by his Austrian predecessors. In the mar-
ginal productivity theory, laborers earn wages, capitalists earn interest, and owners of specific fac-
tors earn rents. Any excess (deficit) of a firm’s realized receipts over these factor payments consti-
tutes profit (loss). Profit and loss, therefore, are returns to entrepreneurship. In a hypothetical equi-
librium without uncertainty (what Mises calls the “evenly rotating economy”), capitalists would still 
earn interest, as a reward for lending, but there would be no profit or loss. 
                                                 
8 In Kirzner’s treatment, entrepreneurship is characterized as “a responding agency. I view the entrepreneur not as a 
source of innovative ideas ex nihilo, but as being alert to the opportunities that exist already and are waiting to be no-
ticed” (Kirzner, 1973: 74). 
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Entrepreneurs, in Mises’s understanding of the market, make their production plans based on 
the current prices of factors of production and the anticipated future prices of consumer goods. 
What Mises calls “economic calculation” is the comparison of these anticipated future receipts with 
present outlays, all expressed in common monetary units. Under socialism, the absence of factor 
markets, and the consequent lack of factor prices, renders economic calculation—and hence rational 
economic planning—impossible. Mises’s point is that a socialist economy may employ workers, 
managers, technicians, inventors, and the like, but it cannot, by definition, employ entrepreneurs, 
because there are no money profits and losses. Entrepreneurship, and not labor or management or 
technological expertise, is the crucial element of the market economy. As Mises puts it: managers 
of socialist enterprises may be allowed to “play market,” to act as if they were managers of private 
firms with their own interests at stake, but entrepreneurs cannot be asked to “play speculation and 
investment” (Mises, 1949: 705). Absent entrepreneurship a complex, dynamic economy cannot 
allocate resources to their highest valued use.9  
OPPORTUNITY IDENTIFICATIONAND OPPORTUNITY EXPLOITATION 
As noted above, while Schumpeter, Kirzner, Cantillon, Knight, and Mises are frequently cited in the 
contemporary entrepreneurship literature in economics and management, much of this literature 
takes, implicitly, an occupational or structural approach to entrepreneurship. The most important 
exception is the rapidly growing literature in management research on opportunity discovery or 
identification —or what Shane (2003) calls the “individual–opportunity nexus.” Opportunity identi-
fication involves not only technical skills like financial analysis and market research, but also less 
tangible forms of creativity, team building, problem solving, and leadership (Long and McMullan, 
1984; Hills, Lumpkin, and Singh, 1997; Hindle, 2004). It can involve both the recognition of al-
ready existing opportunities and the creation, ex nihilo, of new opportunities (Alvarez and Barney, 
                                                 
9 Mises and Kirzner are usually treated together as offering a unified Austrian account of the entrepreneur. Indeed, 
Kirzner, a leading member of the modern Austrian school, received his Ph.D. under Mises at New York University and 
has described his work as the working out of various parts of Mises’s system. However, we see Mises in the Cantillon-
Knight tradition of viewing entrepreneurship as judgment over the deployment of resources, not alertness per se. Kirz-
ner (1973: 39-40) agrees that in a world of uncertainty, resource owners exercise entrepreneurial judgment in allocating 
their resources to particular uses. But he goes on (1973: 40-43) to introduce the analytical device of “pure entrepreneur-
ship,” the act of discovery or alertness to profit opportunities by those with no resources under their control, and claims 
that this function, rather than uncertainty-bearing, is the “driving force” behind the market economy. We do not find 
this argument convincing. For more on this see Klein (1999: 24-25). 
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2007).10 Whatever that is, the overall conception is that opportunities is the unit of analysis for en-
trepreneurship research. However, it is potential problem that the opportunity-discovery approach 
has not been forthcoming concerning definitions of the key construct. Perhaps for this reason, it is 
not clear how opportunities should be dimensionalized and measured.   
Opportunities: Objective or Subjective? 
Shane and Venkataraman (2000: 220) define entrepreneurial opportunities as “those situations 
in which new goods, services, raw materials, and organizing methods can be introduced and sold at 
greater than their cost of production.” These opportunities are treated as objective phenomena, 
though their existence is not known to all agents. Shane and Venkataraman also distinguish entre-
preneurial opportunities from profit opportunities more generally. While the latter reflect opportuni-
ties to create value by enhancing the efficiency of producing existing goods, services, and 
processes, the former refer to value creation through “the discovery of new means-ends frame-
works.” Shane and Venkataraman seem to have in mind the distinction between activities that can 
be modeled as solutions to well-specified optimization problems — what Kirzner (1973) calls 
“Robbinsian maximizing” — and those for which no existing model, or decision rule, is available.  
However, Shane and Venkataraman appear to misunderstand Kirzner (and the Austrians more 
generally) on this point. In a world of Knightian uncertainty, all profit opportunities involve deci-
sions for which no well-specified maximization problem is available; therefore, there is no distinc-
tion between entrepreneurial and other opportunities. In Knightian terms, profit is never the result of 
bearing risk, but always the result of bearing uncertainty.  
The opportunity-discovery literature in management seeks to build a positive research program 
by operationalizing the concept of alertness. As summarized by Gaglio and Katz (2001): 
Almost all of the initial empirical investigations of alertness have focused on the 
means by which an individual might literally “notice without search.” For example, 
Kaish and Gilad (1991) interpret this as having an aptitude to position oneself in the 
flow of information so that the probability of encountering opportunities without a 
deliberate search for a specific opportunity is maximized. Therefore, in their opera-
tional measures of alertness, they asked founders to recall: (a) the amount of time 
and effort exerted in generating an information flow; (b) the selection of information 
                                                 
10 While value can of course be created not only by starting new activities, but also by improving the operation of exist-
ing activities, research in opportunity identification tends to emphasize the launching of new ventures (firms, products, 
or services). 
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sources for generating an information flow; and (c) the cues inherent in information 
that signal the presence of an opportunity. From this data the authors deduced: (d) 
the quantity of information in the flow and (e) the breadth and diversity of informa-
tion in the flow. 
Their results conform to expectations in some ways but also reveal some unexpected 
patterns. Compared to the sample of corporate executives, the sample of new venture 
founders do appear to spend more time generating an information flow and do seem 
more likely to use unconventional sources of information. Interestingly, the founders 
do seem more attentive to risk cues rather than to market potential cues. However, 
the data also reveal that only inexperienced or unsuccessful founders engage in such 
intense information collection efforts. Successful founders actually behave more like 
the sample of corporate executives. Cooper et al. (1995) found a similar pattern of 
results in their survey of 1100 firms although Busenitz (1996), in an altered replica-
tion of Kaish and Gilad's survey, did not. Indeed Busenitz found few significant dif-
ferences between corporate managers and new venture founders. In addition, validity 
checks of the survey measures yielded low reliability scores, which led the author to 
conclude that future research in alertness required improved theoretical and opera-
tional precision. 
This positive research program may miss the point of Kirzner’s notion of entrepreneurial alert-
ness: namely, that it is an instrumental construct designed, not to characterize entrepreneurship per 
se, but to explain the tendency for markets to clear. Theoretical concepts may be invested with dif-
ferent degrees of “anonymity” or abstraction (Schütz, 1932). For example, understanding how firms 
adapt to changed circumstances requires a less anonymous/abstract theory of the firm (e.g., Cyert 
and March, 1963) relative to the theory of the firm in basic price theory in economics, which on the 
other hand is adequate for the purposes of price theoretic analysis (Machlup, 1967).  By the same 
token understanding the entrepreneur’s role in the overall market process requires a model of the 
entrepreneur that is less detailed (more anonymous) than if the purpose is to understand what makes 
a particular entrepreneur discovery particular types of opportunities (as in Shane, 2003).   
Kirzner’s fundamental aim is to provide the theory of market clearing (i.e., a situation with no 
unexploited profit opportunities), called for by Hayek (1937), by invoking the entrepreneur as the 
mechanism that drives the market towards equilibrium. In Kirzner’s approach opportunities are (ex-
ogenous) arbitrage opportunities and nothing more. For this reason, Kirzner offers no theory of how 
opportunities come to be identified, who identifies them, and so on; identification itself is a black 
box. The claim is simply that outside the Arrow–Debreu world in which all knowledge is effective-
ly parameterized, opportunities for disequilibrium profit exist and tend to be discovered and ex-
ploited. In putting forward this claim, Kirzner makes no specific claims regarding the motivation 
and cognition of entrepreneur other than that they are motivated by the lure of profit and that they 
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will tend to discover opportunities.  This highly anonymous portrayal of the entrepreneur may be 
contrasted with the much richer models of entrepreneurs in the recent opportunity-discovery litera-
ture in management.   
Contemporary entrepreneurship scholars, considering whether opportunities are objective or 
subjective (McMullen and Shepherd, 2006; Companys and McMullen, 2007), note that Kirzner 
tends to treat them as objective. Again, this is true, but misses the point. Kirzner is not making an 
ontological claim about the nature of profit opportunities per se — not claiming, in other words, that 
opportunities are, in some fundamental sense, objective — but merely using the concept of objec-
tive, exogenously given, but not-yet-discovered opportunities as a device for explaining the tenden-
cy of markets to clear.  
The Knightian perspective also treats entrepreneurship as an instrumental construct, used here to 
decompose business income into two constituent elements, interest and profit. Interest is a reward 
for forgoing present consumption, is determined by the relative time preferences of borrowers and 
lenders, and would exist even in a world of certainty. Profit, by contrast, is a reward for correctly 
anticipating the uncertain future (e.g., purchasing factors of production at prices below the eventual 
selling price of the product), and exists only in a world of “true” uncertainty. In such a world, given 
that production takes time, entrepreneurs will earn either profits or losses based on the differences 
between factor prices paid and product prices received.  
For Knight, in other words, opportunities do not exist, waiting to be discovered (and hence, by 
definition, exploited). Rather, entrepreneurs invest resources based on their expectations of future 
consumer demands and market conditions, investments that may or may not yield positive return. 
Here the focus is not on opportunities, but on investment and uncertainty. Expectations about the 
future are inherently subjective and, under conditions of uncertainty rather than risk, constitute 
judgments that are not themselves modelable. Put differently, subjectivism implies that opportuni-
ties are neither “discovered” nor “created” (Alvarez and Barney, 2007), but perceived. They may or 
may not exist, in an objective sense. Hence a research program based on formalizing and studying 
empirically the processes leading individuals to discover opportunities, whether based on econom-
ics or psychology, seems dangerously close to being misguided. Opportunities for entrepreneurial 
gain are inherently subjective, in the sense that they do not exist until profits are realized. As a min-
imum empirical research on opportunity discovery must take this into account.   
Opportunities as a Black Box 
 17
Confusion over the nature of opportunities is increasingly recognized. As noted by McMullen, 
Plummer, and Acs (2007: 273),  
a good portion of the research to date has focused on the discovery, exploitation, and 
consequences thereof without much attention to the nature and source of opportunity 
itself. Although some researchers argue that the subjective or socially constructed 
nature of opportunity makes it impossible to separate opportunity from the individu-
al, others contend that opportunity is as an objective construct visible to or created 
by the knowledgeable or attuned entrepreneur. Either way, a set of weakly held as-
sumptions about the nature and sources of opportunity appear to dominate much of 
the discussion in the literature. 
Do we need a precise definition of opportunities to move forward? Can one do entrepreneurship 
research without specifying what, exactly, entrepreneurial opportunities “are”? Can we treat oppor-
tunities as a “black box,” much as other concepts in management such as culture, leadership, rou-
tines, capabilities, and the like are treated (Abell, Felin, and Foss, 2007)? 
One approach is to focus not on what opportunities are, but what opportunities do. Opportuni-
ties, in this sense, are treated as a latent construct that is manifested in entrepreneurial action—
investment, creating new organizations, bringing products to market, and so on. A direct analogy 
can be drawn to the economist’s notion of preferences. Economic theory (with the exception of be-
havioral economics, discussed below) takes agents’ preferences as given and derives implications 
for choice. The economist does not care what preferences “are,” ontologically, but simply postulates 
their existence and draws inferences about their characteristics as needed to explain particular kinds 
of economic behavior. Empirically, this approach can be operationalized by treating entrepreneur-
ship as a latent variable in a structural-equations framework (Xue and Klein, 2007). 
By treating opportunities as a latent construct, this approach sidesteps the problem of defining 
opportunities as objective or subjective, real or imagined, and so on. The formation of entrepre-
neurial beliefs is treated as a potentially interesting psychological problem, but not part of the eco-
nomic analysis of entrepreneurship. It also avoids thorny questions about whether alertness or 
judgment is simply luck (Demsetz, 1983), a kind of intuition (Dane and Pratt, 2007), or something 
else entirely. 
The Unit of Analysis: From Opportunities to Investments 
If opportunities are inherently subjective, and if we may be best off by treating them as a black 
box, then the unit of analysis should not be opportunities, but rather some action — in Knightian 
terms, the assembly of resources in the present in anticipation of (uncertain) receipts in the future, in 
 18
other words, investments. Again, the analogy with preferences in microeconomic theory is clear: the 
unit of analysis in consumer theory is not preferences but consumption. In neoclassical production 
theory the unit of analysis is not the production function but some decision variable.  
One way to capture the Knightian concept of entrepreneurial action is Casson’s notion of 
“projects” (Casson, 2007; Casson and Wadeson, 2007). A project is a stock of resources committed 
to particular activities for a specified period of time. (Opportunities are defined as potential, but 
currently inactive, projects). Focusing on projects, rather than opportunities, implies an emphasis 
not on opportunity identification, but on opportunity exploitation, not identification. More general-
ly, this perspective suggests that entrepreneurship research should focus on the execution of busi-
ness plans.11  
Making investment the unit of analysis suggests links to the real-options approach to the firm 
(Reuer and Tong, 2007) and an older literature (summarized by Klein, 1999: 32-33) on firms as 
investments. These literatures treat capital as not simply another factor that the entrepreneur can 
purchase at a price representing its marginal productivity, but as the ultimate, decision-making or 
controlling factor. Investment resources are allocated not to maximize the level of profit in a given 
project, but to maximize the (expected) rate of return across projects (just as divisionalized firms 
allocate internal resources across profit centers). If the entrepreneur-investors ability to exercise 
control is limited, then she will not pursue all positive-NPV projects, only those she can supervise 
effectively. Hence individuals who create or discover opportunities, however defined, may be una-
ble to pursue them without close ties to people willing to commit funds to projects. 
Entrepreneurial Judgment as a Natural Complement to the Theory of the Firm 
Because most entrepreneurial ventures somehow involve a firm, entrepreneurship would seem to 
be a central subject in the economic theory of the firm.. However, one seeks in vain for references to 
the entrepreneur in the leading textbooks and research articles on the theory of the firm. Similarly, the 
strategic-management literature has not had a strong role for the entrepreneur. (Within the Academy of 
Management, the Entrepreneurship interest group is separate from the Business Policy and Strategy 
and Organization Theory groups.) And yet, entrepreneurship is ultimately the main source of value 
creation at the firm level. Indeed, the firm’s key strategic decisions—strategy formulation, market 
                                                 
11 See Salerno (2007) for the case that the Austrian economists, prior to Kirzner (1973), uniformly emphasized property 
ownership as inextricably linked to entrepreneurship. 
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analysis, industry positioning, diversification, vertical integration and outsourcing, organizational 
design—are ultimately entrepreneurial decisions (Foss and Klein, 2002; Yu, 2005; Matthews, 2006) 
But it is only very recently that the strategic management field has realized the need for a closer 
relationship with entrepreneurship, resulting in the 2008 start-up of the Strategic Entrepreneurship 
Journal. The fields of organizational behavior and human-resource management may follow suit. 
While the view of entrepreneurship as judgment appears in many writers, it is most often asso-
ciated with Knight (1921). For Knight, firm organization, profit, and the entrepreneur are closely 
related. In his view, these arise as an embodiment, a result, and a cause, respectively, of commercial 
experimentation (Demsetz, 1988).12  
Knight introduces the notion of judgment to link profit and the firm to the existence of uncertainty. 
Judgment primarily refers to the process of businessmen forming estimates of future events in situa-
tions in which there is no agreement or idea at all on probabilities of occurrence. It may be defined as a 
service that enhances the quality of decisions in novel situations that require an urgent decision, a ser-
vice that is learned and has a large tacit component. Entrepreneurship represents judgment that cannot 
be assessed in terms of its marginal product and which cannot, accordingly, be paid a wage.13 This is 
because entrepreneurship is judgment in relation to the most uncertain events, such as starting a new 
firm, defining a new market, and the like.  
In other words, there is no market for the judgment that entrepreneurs rely on, and utilizing 
judgment therefore requires the person with judgment to start a firm. Moreover, judgment implies 
asset ownership. Judgmental decision-making is ultimately decision-making about the employment 
of resources. An entrepreneur without capital goods is, in Knight’s sense, no entrepreneur.14 This 
                                                 
12 Knight explains that “[w]ith uncertainty entirely absent, every individual being in possession of perfect knowledge, there 
would be no occasion for anything of the nature of responsible management or control of productive activities . . . Its exis-
tence in the world is a direct result of the fact of uncertainty” (1921: 267, 271).   
13  “The receipt of profit in a particular case may be argued to be the result of superior judgment. But it is judgment of 
judgment, especially one's own judgment, and in an individual case there is no way of telling good judgment from good 
luck and a succession of cases sufficient to evaluate the judgment or determine its probable value transforms the profit 
into a wage. . . . If . . . capacities were known, the compensation for exercising them can be competitively imputed and 
is a wage; only, in so far as they are unknown or known only to the possessor himself, do they give rise to a profit” 
(Knight, 1921: 311). 
14 Carl Menger’s (1871) treatment of production gives the entrepreneur a similar role.  Production requires an “act of 
will” and “supervision of the execution of the production plan.” These functions “entail property ownership and, there-
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implies an obvious link with the theory of the firm, particularly those (transaction cost and property 
rights theories) that define asset ownership as a crucial ingredient of firm organization (Williamson, 
1996; Hart, 1995). The firm, in this sense, is the entrepreneur and the assets he owns, and therefore 
ultimately controls. The theory of the firm is essentially a theory of how the entrepreneur exercises 
his judgmental decision-making—what combinations of assets will he seek to acquire, what (prox-
imate) decisions will he delegate to subordinates, how will he provide incentives and employ moni-
toring to see that his assets are used consistently with his judgments, and so on.  
CONCLUSION 
This paper has revealed a substantial variety in how economists and management theorists have 
conceived the entrepreneurial function. Our argument suggests that the heavy emphasis in contem-
porary entrepreneurship research on the antecedents and nature of entrepreneurial opportunities may 
have hampered the integration of entrepreneurship into economics and strategic management, in-
cluding the theory of the firm. Rather than focusing on opportunities per se, researchers might do 
better by treating opportunities as a latent construct that is manifested in entrepreneurial action, 
namely the exercise of judgment over the arrangement of heterogeneous capital assets. The Austrian 
theory of capital, interpreted in the “attributes” framework described above, provides a useful 
framework for conducting such analysis, linking the Knightian theory of entrepreneurship and the 
theory of economic organization (see further, Foss, Foss, Klein and Klein, 2007). The result is a 
theory that organically integrates notions of heterogeneous resources, organization, and entrepre-
neurship. Such a theory, we submit, is richer in predictive content and ultimately more satisfactory 
than the contemporary concern with opportunity discovery.   
  
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                                  
fore, mark the Mengerian entrepreneur as a capitalist–entrepreneur” (Salerno, 1998: 30). Menger describes “command 
of the services of capital” as a “necessary prerequisite” for economic activity. Even in large firms, although he may 
employ “several helpers,” the entrepreneur himself continues to bear uncertainty, perform economic calculation, and 
supervise production, even if these functions “are ultimately confined . . . to determining the allocation of portions of 
wealth to particular productive purposes only by general categories, and to selection and control of persons” (Menger, 
1871: 160–61).  
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